

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 01 OF 06 170923Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 ICAE-00
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2276

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON NEW WESTERN
INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 96686 DTG 142251Z APR 78

WE ARE TRANSMITTING BELOW THE AHG APPROVED CONTINGENCY
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE.
QUESTIONS 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20 AND 22 OF
THE QUESTIONS DELAING WITH PHASE I COMMITMENTS ABOUT PHASE II
REDUCTIONS AND QUESTIONS 1, 4A, 5, AND 6 OF THE QUES-
TIONS DEALING WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
USED WITH THE EAST. BEGIN TEXT

(CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON WESTERN INITIATIVE)

(#INDICATED THAT QUESTION AND ANSWER IS TAKEN FROM NAC QUIDANCE)

I. QUESTIONS ON PHASE I COMMITMENTS ABOUT PHASE II REDUCTIONS

#1. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK HOW MANY REDUCTIONS THE WEST
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 01 OF 06 170923Z

EXPECTS THE USSR TO TAKE IN PHASE II BEYOND THOSE PROPOSED FOR
PHASE I.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THESE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS ARE ADDRESSED TO THE EASTERN
INTEREST IN A WESTERN COMMITMENT ON AMOUNT AND TIMING OF PHASE

II REDUCTIONS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE PROPOSALS DO NOT SEEK TO RESOLVE ALL ASPECTS OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE WEST EXPECTS THE USSR TO TAKE ITS SHARE OF TOTAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS.

#2. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK HOW MANY REDUCTIONS THE WEST EXPECTS THE US TO TAKE IN PHASE II.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THIS ISSUE HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED.

#3. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK HOW MANY REDUCTIONS THE WEST EXPECTS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA TO TAKE IN PHASE II UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THE OVERALL NUMBER WILL BE SPECIFIED IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT AFTER AGREEMENT ON DATA IS REACHED.

#4. POSSIBLE SITUATION

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00223 01 OF 06 170923Z

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK HOW THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD OPERATE BETWEEN STAGES 1 AND 2 OF ALTERNATIVE ONE.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE.

AFTER STAGE 1 HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED, THE LEVEL OF THE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF STAGE 1 REDUCTIONS BY EACH SIDE.

#5. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHETHER THE SPECIFIC PHASE I LIMITATIONS ON US AND USSR MILITARY MANPOWER WOULD BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARDS IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT TO REFLECT PHASE II US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THIS WOULD BE SO.

#6. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHY THE WEST IS SAYING THAT
THE UNDERTAKINGS REGARDING PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE GIVEN
"IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT".

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THIS WORDING HAS BEEN USED IN ORDER TO LEAVE OPEN THE
QUESTION OF THE FORM IN WHICH THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE
EXPRESSED.

7. POSSIBLE SITUATION

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00223 01 OF 06 170923Z

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES STATE THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS
INDICATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE WEST TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT
TO MAKE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. BUT THIS

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 02 OF 06 180706Z
ACTION ACDA-12

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR MRN 0223 VICE 0023

COMMITMENT IS A COLLECTIVE ONE. HOW CAN EASTERN PARTICIPANTS
KNOW WHAT REDUCTIONS WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL
TAKE INDIVIDUALLY? HOW CAN EASTERN PARTICIPANTS KNOW THAT THE
LARGEST WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCE WILL BE REDUCED BY ANY SIZEABLE

AMOUNT?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THE CONCEPT OF A COLLECTIVE REDUCTION COMMITMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE MANPOWER LIMITATIONS AND WITH THE WESTERN OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL CEILINGS.
2. ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS REDUCTION.
3. WHAT SHOULD BE OF INTEREST TO EASTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IS THAT THE WESTERN FORCES FACING THEM IN THE AREA WILL BE REDUCED BY A CERTAIN SPECIFIED AMOUNT AT A CERTAIN SPECIFIED TIME AND THAT THEY WILL NOT EXCEED THE AGREED RESIDUAL LEVEL.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 02 OF 06 180706Z

4. FINALLY, IT IS OUR POSITION THAT THE INTERNAL COMPOSITION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN REDUCTIONS IS NOT A MATTER FOR EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS.

8. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK IF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA ARE WILLING TO EXPAND THE CONTENT OF THEIR PHASE I COMMITMENT CONCERNING PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO DEAL WITH SUCH MATTERS AS REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, OR REDUCTION BY UNITS.

ALTERNATIVELY, EASTERN REPS ASK WHAT THE WEST MEANS BY "MODALITIES" OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN REPSONSE

1. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, FROM FEBRUARY 1976 ON, THE EAST HAS REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR A GENERAL COMMITMENT FROM THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS TO THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF THEIR PAHSE II REDUCTIONS.
2. IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE STATED THAT, OTHER THAN THIS COMMITMENT, ALL TOPICS CONCERNED WITH PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE RESERVED FOR NEGOTIATION IN PHASE II. AND, OF COURSE, THEIR FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR A SECOND NEGOTIATION FOR THIS PURPOSE.
3. WESTERN PARTICIAPNTS ARE WILLING TO MAKE THIS IMPORTANT MOVE TOWARDS THE EASTERN POSITION AND TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON THE AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR PHASE II MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

ALL OTHER QUESTIONS REGARDING PHASE II REDUCTIONS
MUST BE RESERVED TO THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00223 02 OF 06 180706Z

9. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHAT ARMAMENTS THE WEST EXPECTS
THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL OTHER WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS TO
WITHDRAW IN PHASE II.

ALTERNATIVELY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHETHER WESTERN
EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS ARE WILLING TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II IS A MATTER
FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.
2. ALL WE ARE ASKING YOU TO AGREE TO NOW IS THAT COMMITMENTS
UNDERTAKEN IN PHASE I CONCERNING REDUCTION AND LIMITATIONS OF
ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US AND SOVIET
ARMAMENTS THE WEST HAS PROPOSED.

10. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES REQUEST WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO

EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE ONE AND ALTERNATIVE
TWO OF A POSSIBLE WESTERN COMMITMENT ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
IS THAT, UNDER ALTERNATIVE ONE, PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BE
TAKEN IN TWO STAGES WHILE, UNDER ALTERNATIVE TWO, PHASE II
REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN A SINGLE STAGE.
2. IT WAS OUR THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST OF THESE ALTERNATIVES
MIGHT PROVIDE THE EAST WITH ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY REGARDING
PHASE II REDUCTIONS IF THE EAST SO DESIRED.

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00223 02 OF 06 180706Z

3. WE ARE WILLING TO USE EITHER ALTERNATIVE.

11. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EAST ASKS FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION ON THE WESTERN POINT THAT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS ARE CONDITIONAL ON AN EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON DATA. WHAT IS "AN EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON DATA"?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

WE HAVE IN MIND REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

#12 POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHETHER THE PHASE I COMMITMENT ON PHASE II REDUCTIONS IS VALID IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTLY IMPLEMENTED BY BOTH SIDES BEFORE PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD BEGIN.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 03 OF 06 171006Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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O 170849Z APR 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2278

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

13. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHEN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ACTUALLY START.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THIS IS A POINT WHICH WOULD BE FIXED IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT.
WE WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON
THIS SUBJECT.

14. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAY THAT THE WEST SUGGESTS THAT
PHASE II REGOTIATIONS COULD ALSO "DEAL WITH OTHER TOPICS WHICH
MAY BE RAISED BY THE PARTICIPANTS". WHAT ARE SUCH TOPICS?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

WE DO NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AT PRESENT. BUT WE THINK
IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES TO LEAVE THE WAY OPEN TO
INTRODUCE NEW PROPOSALS AND CONCEPTS INTO PHASE II IF THEY SO
DESIRE. THESE OF COURSE WOULD NOT AFFECT THE COMMITMENTS
UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 03 OF 06 171006Z

15. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK, ARE THE FIXED PERIODS OF TIME FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS WHICH THE WEST HAS
SUGGESTED MEANT TO BE ILLUSTRATIVE?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THE PRECISE TIMING WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY
MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

16. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK IF THE 40 PERCENT AND 60 PERCENT
FIGURES FOR REDUCTION FOR THE TWO STAGES OF PHASE II UNDER
ALTERNATIVE ONE ARE ILLUSTRATIVE.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS MINOR ADJUSTMENTS.

17. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES STATE THAT, IF THERE IS NO PHASE II AGREE-
MENT, MANY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE WEST SUCH AS ARMAMENT REDUC-
TIONS AND LIMITATIONS WOULD BE SETTLED ON TERMS DESIRED BY THE
WEST. THEY ASK WHAT IS THEN THE WESTERN INCENTIVE TO
CONCLUDE A PHASE II AGREEMENT.

ALTERNATIVELY, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK FOR FURTHER

CLARIFICATION OF THE POINT OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF SECTION 1 OF THE
INITIATIVE PROVIDING THAT IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00223 03 OF 06 171006Z

RESULT IN AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE WOULD NEVERTHELESS IMPLEMENT
THOSE PHASE II REDUCTIONS SPECIFIED IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE
I AGREEMENT.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR A
BINDING WESTERN COMMITMENT IN PHASE I ON THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS
BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US. THEY HAVE ALSO
SAID THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT CULMINATE IN AGREEMENT.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROVISION IS TO MAKE THE WESTERN COMMITMENT
WHICH WE ARE NOW OFFERING A BINDING ONE, WHETHER OR NOT A PHASE II
AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE AGREED TIME PERIODS.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE NOT WILLING TO EXPAND THIS
COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE IN IT MORE THAN THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF PHASE
II REDUCTIONS, WHICH IS WHAT THE EAST HAS ALWAYS ASKED FOR.

18. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES POINT OUT THAT THE NEW WESTERN
PROPOSALS PROVIDE IN PARA 5 THAT PHASE I WOULD PROVIDE THAT, IF
PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT RESULT IN TIMELY AGREEMENT, EACH
SIDE WOULD NEVERTHELESS IMPLEMENT THOSE PHASE II REDUCTIONS
SPECIFIED IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT. EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES ASK HOW THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT
IF THERE IS NO PHASE II AGREEMENT BEFORE THE TIME AGREED IN
PHASE I.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THE WESTERN INTENTION IN INCLUDING THIS PROVISION IN
OUR PROPOSALS WAS TO OFFER EASTERN PARTICIPANTS A FIRM COMMITMENT
IN PHASE I REGARDING THE OVERALL AMOUNT AND TIMING OF MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN PHASE II BY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA.

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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00223 03 OF 06 171006Z

2. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, WITH A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I AGREEMENT
BEHIND THEM, IT WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS
TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT IN PHASE II ALSO.

3. HOWEVER, IT MIGHT BECOME CLEAR AT SOMEPOINT IN TIME AFTER THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ALL ISSUES OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT BEFORE THE TIME LIMITS AGREED IN PHASE I FOR PHASE II REDUCTION HAD BEEN REACHED.

4. IN THIS EVENT, PARTICIPANTS WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE POINTS ON WHICH DEFINITE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY THAT TIME.

5. (AS NEEDED) AS REGARDS POINTS ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE UP TO PARTICIPANTS TO ACT AS THEY DEEMED FIT, OF COURSE IN CONFORMITY WITH OBLIGATIONS TAKEN IN PHASE I

19. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN THAT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD NOT BASICALLY CHANGE THE INEQUITABLE MILITARY OUTCOME ENVISAGED BY THE ORIGINAL WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH BECAUSE THE INITIATIVE IS TIED TO ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 04 OF 06 171018Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE PRESENT EASTERN POSITION IS THAT THE EAST ACCEPTS PARITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER AS AN OUTCOME.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE DATA DISCUSSION NOW INPROGRESS IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE STRENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

3. SUCH AGREEMENT, PLUS AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC LEVEL FOR THE COMMON CEILING, WOULD INDICATE THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES.

4. RATHER THAN ENGAGING IN AN ABSTRACT DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAKE AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT TO COME TO AGREEMENT ON THE DATA.

20. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES NOTE THAT THE INITIATIVE PROVIDES THAT THE US AND USSR, PRIOR TO SIGNING A PHASE I AGREEMENT, WOULD EXCHANGE LISTS CONTAINING CERTAIN SPECIFIED INFORMATION ON THE MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE WITHDRAWN. THEY ASK IF THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 04 OF 06 171018Z

SAME INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS SPECIFIED IN PHASE I.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THIS ISSUE BELONGS TO THE MODALITIES OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

21. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAY THAT THE TEXT OF THE WESTERN INITIATIVE INDICATES THAT THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND ASK IF THIS IS CORRECT.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

THE TEXT OF THE INITIATIVE INDICATES THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY.

22. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHAT THE WEST MEANS IN SAYING THAT IT INTENDS TO ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES "AS A MATTER TO BE AGREED IN PHASE I".

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. WHAT WE MEAN IS THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN PROVISIONS ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

2. AS TO OTHER ASPECTS, WE ARE CONSIDERING THIS TOPIC AND
WILL GIVE FURTHER DETAILS AT A LATER TIME.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00223 04 OF 06 171018Z

II. QUESTIONS ON PHASE I REDUCTIONS

1. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES POINT OUT THAT THE WEST IS NOW
REQUIRING A WITHDRAWAL OF FIVE SOVIET DIVISIONS INSTEAD OF A
TANK ARMY. CAN THESE DIVISIONS BE WITHDRAWN FROM ANYWHERE
WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA?

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

YES.

2. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EAST ASKS IF THERE WILL BE A RESIDUAL LIMITATION ON THE
NUMBER OF SOVIET DIVISIONS IN THE AREA.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS THAT WE ARE PROPOSING IN THE
THE WESTERN INITIATIVE THAT THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO
AGREE THAT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD SPECIFY THAT THERE WILL
BE NO LIMITATION ON THE OVERALL NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET UNITS
IN THE AREA.

2. THE WEST'S NEW PROPOSALS ALSO PROVIDE THAT THERE WOULD
BE RESIDUAL LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE
TANKS. THIS PROPOSAL IS MADE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE WEST
WILL, THROUGH EFFECTIVE ASSOCIATED MEASURES, RECEIVE THE
ASSURANCE IT HAS ALWAYS SOUGHT THAT LIMITATIONS WILL BE
RESPECTED.

3. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHAT IS THE LOGIC OF REQUIRING
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00223 04 OF 06 171018Z

SOVIET FORCES TO WITHDRAW IN DIVISIONS IF THERE ARE TO BE NO
LIMITATIONS ON DIVISIONS?

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 05 OF 06 171027Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE EXTENT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE COMBAT CAPABILITIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, BACKED BY THE LARGE SOVIET FORCES IN THE USSR. FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE REQUIRED THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

2. NOW, IN AN EFFORT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THIS REQUIREMENT TO ONE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FIVE DIVISIONS.

3. BUT WE CONSIDER THE FIVE DIVISIONS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN ORDER TO SECURE AN OUTCOME WHICH CONTRIBUTES EFFECTIVELY TO ENHANCED STABILITY IN EUROPE

4. THE PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MAKE IT FAR EASIER FOR THE SOVIET UNION THAN FOR THE US TO REINTRODUCE WITHDRAWN FORCES IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY.

5. TO MEET EXPRESSED EASTERN CONCERNS, THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS ALSO PROVIDE THAT APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF ITS PHASE I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WILL RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 05 OF 06 171027Z

UNITS OR SUBUNITS, DESPITE THE DISADVANTAGES WHICH GEOGRAPHY IMPOSES ON THE US.

6. WE THINK THE REQUIREMENT THAT FIVE SOVIET DIVISIONS BE WITHDRAWN IS A REASONABLE ONE IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND OF THE OBLIGATIONS THE WEST IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE.

4.A. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPS POINT OUT THAT THE FIGURE OF 68,000 MEN WOULD NOT EQUAL THE MANPOWER IN FIVE SOVIET DIVISIONS, AND ASK WHICH IS THE CONTROLLING REQUIREMENT.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

IF THE TOTAL MANPOWER IN THE FIVE WITHDRAWN SOVIET DIVISIONS IS LESS THAN 68,000 MEN, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD EXPECT WITHDRAWALS OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET UNITS WHOSE COMBINED MANPOWER WOULD BRING TOTAL SOVIET WITHDRAWALS TO 68,000 MEN.

4B. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPS ASK WHAT SIZE UNITS THE WEST HAS IN MIND HERE.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

WE WILL ANSWER THIS QUESTION AT A LATER POINT.

5. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPS POINT OUT THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF 1700 TANKS WHOSE WITHDRAWAL IS REQUIRED BY THE WEST EXCEEDS THE NUMBER
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00223 05 OF 06 171027Z

OF TANKS NORMALLY ASSIGNED TO FIVE DIVISIONS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

OUR PROPOSAL IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FIVE DIVISIONS INCLUDING THEIR MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND ADD TO THIS NUMBER OF TANKS THE NECESSARY MAIN BATTLE TANKS TO MAKE UP THE TOTAL OF 1700.

6. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPS ASK WHAT THE WEST MEANS BY UNITS OR SUBUNITS, WHEN THE WEST SAYS THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO AGREE THAT APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF ITS PHASE I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS OR SUBUNITS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT WESTERN PROPOSALS, THE TERM "UNIT" COULD MEAN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS REGIMENTS OR BATTALIONS. IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT, THE TERM "SUBUNIT" COULD BE COMPANIES OR PLATOONS.

2. THE US HAS NOT YET DETERMINED ON A SPECIFIC COMPOSITION OF PHASE I US WITHDRAWALS OR ON THE UNITS OR SUBUNITS WHICH WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THESE WITHDRAWALS.

3. HOWEVER, THE UNITS AND SUBUNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN WOULD BE SPECIFIED ON THE LISTS TO BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT.

7. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPS ASK WHETHER THE US COMMITMENT THAT

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00223 06 OF 06 171030Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0223

APPROXIMATELY TWO-THIRDS OF ITS PHASE I MANPOER REDUCTION WOULD RESULT IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS WILL APPPEAR IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

IT WOULD NOT. THESE UNITS AND SUBUNITS WOULD APPEAR ON THE LISTS TO BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

8. POSSIBLE SITUATION

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES NOTE THAT THE WEST IS ASKING THE
USSR TO REDUCE FIVE DIVISIONS WHICH ARE COMBAT UNITS. THEY
ASK WHAT PART OF US UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL BE COMBAT UNITS.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

NO DECISION ON THIS POINT HAS YET BEEN REACHED. THE
ACTUAL UNITS AND SUBUNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL BE LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL LIST TO BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A PHASE I
AGREEMENT.

9. POSSIBLE SITUATION

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00223 06 OF 06 171030Z

EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASK WHAT DISPOSITION WOULD BE MADE
OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT OF US UNITS WITHDRAWN IN
PHASE I.

SUGGESTED WESTERN RESPONSE

1. AS YOU KNOW, THE WEST HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION WITH
REGARD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES IN PHASE I AND HAS
DROPPED THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE ARMAMENTS OF WITHDRAWN SOVIET
UNITS, OTHER THAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS, BE WITHDRAWN WITH THOSE
UNITS.

2. IT IS THEREFORE UP TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO
DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO WITHDRAW THE ARMAMENTS OF THE FIVE
SOVIET DIVISIONS ASIDE FROM THEIR MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

3. THE SAME WILL APPLY TO THE ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT OF
WITHDRAWN US UNITS. SINCE THEIR REDUCTION WILL NOT BE
STIPULATED IN AN AGREEMENT AND CONSEQUENTLY WILL NOT BE SUBJECT
TO LIMITATION, IT WILL REMAIN OPEN TO US AUTHORITIES TO DECIDE
WHAT TO DO WITH THEM. END TEXT.RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, DISARMAMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00223
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780165-0172
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780449/aaaabpuy.tel
Line Count: 805
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 STATE 96686
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2945045
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bd5488ac-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014